Diagnostics + Genomics: The Most Realistic Path to Stopping the Next Pandemic

The BSL-4 Boom: Pandemic Preparedness Needs a Biosecurity Upgrade

The COVID-19 era supercharged high-containment lab capacity worldwide—especially BSL-4 facilities. That’s good for research and preparedness, but risky without equally strong oversight, workforce standards, infrastructure resilience, and cyberbiosecurity. We need a smarter global biosecurity order to keep pace.

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A Rapid Build-Out—And Its Blind Spots

Between 2019 and 2023, the number of high-containment biological laboratories—particularly BSL-4—jumped from 51 to 69, the largest expansion in history. These facilities are essential for studying dangerous pathogens, preventing natural outbreaks, and preparing against bioterrorism. But the scale and speed of growth have outpaced the guardrails required to keep them safe. Without stronger oversight, expansion can itself become a biosecurity risk.

Location, Location… Risk

Roughly 75% of new BSL-4 facilities are slated for densely populated urban areas in countries with weaker governance and political stability. That combination raises the stakes: if accidents or intentional misuse occur, high population density and mobility can accelerate local outbreaks into global crises.

The Workforce Squeeze

• In the United States, those authorized to work in HCBLs ballooned from 10,365 (2018) to 50,500 (2023). Rapid growth can dilute expertise and pull talent away from other urgent public health needs (e.g., drug-resistant bacteria).
• Countries building new capacity face an even steeper climb. Fourteen new BSL-4 labs in India, Kazakhstan, the Philippines, Singapore, and Côte d’Ivoire alone will require recruiting ~10,284 scientists. Maintaining rigorous training and oversight across such rapid onboarding is hard—and human error remains the leading driver of incidents.
• Larger workforces also increase insider-threat exposure. Background checks, psychological screening, and certifications help—but their rigor and consistency vary widely.

When Things Go Wrong (and Aren’t Reported)

• 2008–2018 (U.S.): Regulators were notified of ~1,677 mishandling incidents involving hazardous pathogens; 877 required medical attention.
• Globally, the lack of standardized, transparent reporting obscures true risk, hampers learning, and weakens prevention.

Infrastructure: Fragile by Default

BSL-4 labs are expensive to build and maintain. Underfunding, aging infrastructure, extreme weather, or conflict can turn technical failures into biological crises.

• A broken laboratory wastewater pipe contributed to a foot-and-mouth disease outbreak in the UK, culminating in the culling of six million animals and >£3 billion in costs.
• Consider a climate- or conflict-driven power outage: if primary and backup systems fail, negative air pressure and other containment safeguards can collapse, risking catastrophic release—especially in today’s hyper-connected world.

The Cyberbiosecurity Frontier

Modern BSL-4 labs are increasingly digitally controlled and AI-enabled—from inventory and access control to automation and design tools. That creates an attack surface:

• Cyber intrusions could manipulate lab software, inventories, or protocols.
• Misuse of AI-assisted design could modify or create dangerous traits (e.g., immune evasion, increased transmissibility, resistance).
• DIY biology and lightly secured “garage labs” raise the risk that leaked methods or compromised digital assets are repurposed by malicious actors—particularly where cybersecurity and biosafety governance are underdeveloped.

What a “New Biosecurity Order” Should Include

1) Stronger Global Oversight

• Empower the WHO (and regional bodies) to set minimum standards, require regular independent audits, and publish compliance dashboards.
• Tie international funding and data-sharing privileges to verifiable safety performance.

2) Professionalized Workforce & Certification

• Establish a global certification pathway for BSL-3/4 personnel, with periodic recertification.
• Fund standardized training pipelines and exchanges to prevent expertise dilution during rapid scale-up.

3) Transparent, Standardized Incident Reporting

• Create a global incident reporting system with harmonized definitions and protected, non-punitive disclosure to incentivize learning rather than concealment.
• Publish anonymized trend reports so the community can spot systemic failures early.

4) Resilient, Climate-Ready Infrastructure

• Require redundant power and fail-safe containment validated under realistic stress tests.
• Site labs away from conflict zones and high-risk flood/fire corridors; harden facilities against extreme weather.

5) Cyberbiosecurity by Design

• Mandate security-by-default: network segmentation, least-privilege access, strong authentication, and continuous monitoring.
• Conduct regular red-team/blue-team exercises, encrypt sensitive inventories, and track AI tool usage with auditable logs.
• Integrate cyberbiosecurity into personnel training and incident playbooks.

6) Equity and Capacity-Building

• Pair infrastructure grants with long-term support for governance, training, and cybersecurity—especially in resource-limited settings.
• Foster international consortia to share best practices, co-develop curricula, and pool expertise.

Preparedness Without Peril

Expanding BSL-4 capacity can strengthen global health security—but only if safety, transparency, workforce quality, infrastructure resilience, and cyberbiosecurity scale at the same pace. By adopting a coherent, international framework for oversight and accountability, we can capture the benefits of preparedness while minimizing the risks of bioerror and bioterror.

Bottom line: Build the labs. Build the guardrails faster.